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In developing countries protected areas often fail to achieve their aim of protecting
natural habitats and endangered animal species (e.g. Barrett and Arcese 1995, Gibson
and Marks 1995, Swanson and Barbier 1992). The reason is that they often act directly
against the economic interests of the local population, which is excluded from land and
wildlife utilization to which it formerly had access. In addition, the protection of many
natural reserves is poorly enforced, because of the vast areas involved and the poor
ﬁnancial situation of the park management (e.g. Kiss 1990). As a consequence, illegal
land and wildlife utilization, such as slashing and burning forests for agricultural use
and hunting game animals for meat, are widespread.
Recently, these shortcomings of the traditional approach to protected area manage-
ment resulted in the implementation of so-called “integrated conservation and devel-
opment projects” (ICDPs). In theory, the ICDP overcomes the open access problem
by coupling conservation and development activities. The development activity creates
revenues which are used to create incentives for the local population to engage in conser-
vation activities. Thus, the successful ICDP results in a “win-win” situation in which (i)
natural habitats and wildlife are protected, and (ii) the income of the local population is
increased, and poverty and hardship are alleviated. In practice, however, many ICDPs
have failed (or are likely to fail) to achieve their conservation goals. The literature on
ICDPs identiﬁes two main reasons for their failure. First, ICDPs may give wrong incen-
tives (e.g. Wells et al. 1992, Ferraro 2001, Ferraro and Kiss 2002). For example, local
people do not voluntarily refrain from poaching if they receive lumpsum transfers, as new
income sources are complements to existing activities rather than substitutes. Second,
ICDPs may give too little incentives. In fact, there is ample evidence that only a small
fraction of the ICDPs’ revenues reach the local communities and, thus, incentives for the
local population to change habits are small (e.g. Barrett and Arcese 1995, Bookbinder
et al. 1998, Gibson and Marks 1995, Wells et al. 1992).
The aim of this paper is to investigate in a theoretical model the reasons for beneﬁt-
sharing ICDPs to fail. As a prime example for an ICDP, which has gained a lot of interest
among both scholars and practitioners, we consider a non-invasive ecotourism enterprise
(e.g. Goodwin 1996, Isaacs 2000). We develop a bio-economic model of local subsistence
farming and hunting communities living on a ﬁxed size of land. In its pristine state it is
the habitat of a native animal species, which can be hunted for game meat. In addition,
the land can be turned into agricultural land, which yields crop production. The state
1is supposed to be unable to enforce property rights on both land and wildlife. Thus, the
local communities face de facto an open access regime. Due to the public good property
of both land and wildlife, the actions of each community impose negative externalities on
all other communities, which are not taken into account by the individual communities
when they decide about the size of farmland to cultivate and how to distribute a ﬁxed
labor endowment between farmland cultivation and hunting. In addition, there is a state
owned enterprise which earns and distributes revenues from ecotourism that depend on
the abundance of wildlife.
Our contribution to the ICDP literature is twofold. First, we show that even well
designed and strong incentives (i.e. distributing all ecotourism revenues to the local
population) lead to lower levels of habitat and wildlife conservation compared to the
social optimum. This is because the public good property of both habitat and wildlife
causes two negative externalities which cannot be internalized by just one policy lever.
Second, we show how a tax/subsidy scheme can be designed that implements the social
optimum. The main problem for such a scheme is that certain actions, such as poaching,
cannot be observed, and thus can neither be taxed nor subsidized. In fact, our solu-
tion to achieve the optimal levels of wildlife and habitat conservation disentangles the
conservation and the development goal. While the ecotourism enterprise determines the
optimal levels of habitat and wildlife conservation, their implementation is achieved by a
self-ﬁnancing tax/subsidy scheme, which itself is viable without the ecotourism revenues.
Our model diﬀers from the existing theoretical literature on the eﬀects of ICDPs in
two key elements. First, while Barrett and Arcese (1998), Johannesen and Skonhoft
(2005), and Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), among others, concentrate on the competition
in wildlife harvest between the locals and the reserve management, we focus attention
to the problem of habitat loss and wildlife exploitation due to externalities, which stem
from the public good property of land and wildlife. Second, in our model the native an-
imal species is conﬁned to the natural habitat. As a consequence, we abstract from the
nuisance argument for poaching that wandering animal herds interfere with agricultural
production (e.g. Johannesen and Skonhoft 2005, Bulte and Rondeau forthcoming, Ron-
deau and Bulte forthcoming). While models which emphasize the nuisance argument for
poaching better ﬁt to rangeland reserves and large mammal species, our model is com-
patible with forest reserves and small mammal or bird species, which crucially depend
on the forest for shelter, food and reproduction (e.g. Bookbinder et al. 1998, Naidoo
and Adamowicz 2005). In fact, our bio-economic model is most closely related to Smith
(1975) and Bulte and Horan (2003), who consider pressure on wildlife conservation due
2to hunting and habitat loss. However, they concentrate on the dynamic development of
a subsistence farming and hunter society in an open access regime, but do not consider
nature and wildlife conservation by ICDP schemes.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the bio-economic model.
The optimal bio-economic equilibrium is derived in section 3. In section 4 we investigate
how diﬀerent decentralized regimes deviate from the social optimum. Therefore, we ﬁrst
develop a generic decentralized model (section 4.1), then we analyze the outcomes of
a laissez faire open access economy (section 4.2) and of a decentralized economy with
sharing ecotourism revenues (section 4.3). As the ICDP case falls short of the social
optimum, we introduce a more encompassing tax/subsidy regime in section 4.4. Section
5 discusses model assumptions with respect to our results and concludes. The proofs of
all propositions are given in the Appendix.
2 A simple bio-economic model
Consider an area of land of ﬁxed size 1, which is split into a homogeneous area of wood
W and a homogeneous area of farmland F, and thus F + W = 1. The wood W is the
habitat of a native animal species bird B. The area of land is also home to n identical
local communities. In line with traditional reasoning, the elders of each community are
supposed to decide over the community’s actions (Marks 1984). Hence, we abstract
from conﬂicting interests within the communities, but in contrast to most of the existing
literature on ICDPs, which assumes the local population to be one homogeneous group,
we consider the externalities that the actions of one community might impose on other
communities. Each community is supposed to act such that it maximizes its own welfare,
where the welfare of community i is given by a welfare function V , which solely depends
on the consumption ci of community i and satisﬁes standard curvature properties (V ′ >
0, V ′′ < 0). Thus, we abstract from an explicit valuation of the levels of both habitat
W and bird population B. Each community i decides about the amount of land fi,
which is used as farmland. Thus, the total size of farmland is given by F =
Pn
i=1 fi. In
addition, each community commands a ﬁxed labor endowment normalized to 1, which
is distributed between farmland cultivation and hunting bird. As all communities are
supposed to be identical, they all use identical technologies for farmland cultivation and
hunting.
Farmland can be cultivated to produce consumption according to the following Cobb-





i , α1 > 0 , 0 < β < 1 , (1)
where li is the amount of labor community i assigns to crop production, α1 is a scaling
factor for the overall productivity of farming, and β and 1 − β are the production
elasticities of farmland and labor in the cultivation of farmland. Thus, crop production
P depends positively on the levels of farmland fi and labor input li (Pfi > 0, Pli > 0)
and exhibits constant returns to scale.1
In addition, communities can produce consumption by hunting bird via a Gordon-
Sch¨ afer production function H, which depends positively on both the bird population
B and the amount of labor assigned to hunting 1 − li
2 (HB > 0, Hli < 0), and exhibits
constant returns to scale with respect to labor
H(B,li) = α2B (1 − li) , α2 > 0 , (2)
where α2 is a scaling factor for the overall productivity of hunting.
Finally, consumption can be generated by a state managed ecotourism enterprise.
We consider a non-invasive form of ecotourism, where the prime incentive for tourists to
engage in ecotourism activities is the excitement of visiting pristine wildlife environments
(e.g. Goodwin 1996, Naidoo and Adamowicz 2005). Thus, total ecotourism revenues are
assumed to depend on the abundance of bird B
E(B) = α3B




where α3 is a scaling factor for the overall productivity of ecotourism, and γ is the
production elasticity of bird in creating ecotourism revenues. We impose γ ≤ 1
2 to
ensure that ecotourism exhibits non-increasing economies of scale in the bio-economic
equilibrium (as B itself depends on the level of wood W).
The bird population reproduces according to the reproduction function R and is re-
1 Throughout the paper derivatives of functions which solely depend on one variable will be denoted by











2 As consumption (and, thus, welfare) can always be increased by assigning additional labor to the
cultivation of farmland, the labor restriction holds with equality in the optimum.









The reproduction function R is supposed to be a logistic growth function, which depends







, ǫ > 0 , (5)
where ǫ measures the reproduction capabilities of bird. The maximal level of bird is
given by the habitat size W. Thus, the level of wood determines the carrying capacity
for the bird population.
For the sake of a tractable model, we do not consider population growth. Thus, the
number of individuals within each community and the number of communities n is
constant. Moreover, we abstract from transitional dynamics and assume a bio-economic
equilibrium, i.e. dB

























Taking further into account that




we see that the bio-economic equilibrium is completely determined by the communities’
choices of fi and li.
3 Farming, hunting and wildlife conservation in the social optimum
Both the habitat size W and the wildlife population B exhibit public good properties.
The bird population directly aﬀects hunting and ecotourism revenues. As the reproduc-
5tion of the bird population depends on the carrying capacity, the habitat size indirectly
aﬀects both the success of hunting and the ecotourism revenues. Thus, the communities’
individual choices of fi and li impose externalities on all other communities which are
not taken into account by the individually maximizing communities. As a consequence,
the decentralized bio-economic equilibrium in which all communities maximize their wel-
fare individually, generally falls short of the Pareto optimal outcome. Before we discuss
the decentralized solution in the next section, we derive the socially optimal outcome,
which is an important benchmark to evaluate the performance of diﬀerent conservation
policies.
Consider a social planner, who seeks to maximize the sum of welfare of all communities
in the bioeconomic equilibrium.3 We assume that all ecotourism revenues are equally
distributed among the communities. Thus, the consumption ci of community i is given
by:
ci = P(fi,li) + H(B,li) +
1
n
E(B) , i = 1,...,n . (9)









V (ci) , (10)
subject to equations (7), (8), (9), and the inequality constraints
0 ≤ 1 − li , i = 1,...,n . (11)
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers for the equality constraints (7), (8) and (9) by λB,
λW and λci, and the Kuhn-Tucker parameter for the inequality constraints (11) by  li,





V (ci) + λci
￿


























3 As all communities are identical, maximizing the sum of welfare of all communities is equivalent to
maximizing the welfare of a representative community.




′(ci) − λci = 0 , i = 1,...,n , (13a)
∂L
∂fi
= λciPfi(fi,li) − λW = 0 , i = 1,...,n , (13b)
∂L
∂li
= λci [Pli(fi,li) + Hli(B,li)] +
α2
ǫ














− λB = 0 , (13d)
∂L
∂W









= 0 , (13e)
 li ≥ 0 ,  li(1 − li) = 0 , i = 1,...,n . (13f)
The Lagrangian L may not be concave, as consumption is the sum of P, H and E, where
P and E are concave functions, but H is not. Hence, the necessary conditions (13) may
not be suﬃcient for an optimal bio-economic equilibrium. The following proposition gives
conditions which guarantee the strict concavity of the Lagrangian.
Proposition 1 (Strict concavity in the social optimum)
Given the maximization problem (10) subject to equations (7), (8), (9) and the inequality
constraints (11), the corresponding Lagrangian L, as given by equation (12), is strictly
concave for all α2 ∈ [0, ¯ α2] with some ¯ α2 > 0.
The proofs of all propositions are given in the appendix. Proposition 1 says that the
Lagrangian L is strictly concave if the overall productivity of hunting is below a certain
threshold, which depends on the whole set of exogenously given parameters. In the
following, we assume that α2 is such that the Lagrangian L is strictly concave, and
thus the necessary conditions (13) are also suﬃcient for a unique optimal bio-economic
equilibrium.
The economic interpretation of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions is straightfor-
ward. Condition (13a) states that in the optimum the shadow price of consumption,
λci, equals marginal welfare for all n communities. In the optimum, the shadow price
of bird, λB, equals the welfare gain of a marginal unit of bird, which is given by the
marginal productivities of bird in hunting and the ecotourism enterprise summed up
over all n communities (see condition (13d)). According to condition (13e), the shadow








, which determines the relationship between wood and bird in the
7bioeconomic equilibrium, as given by equation (6). It captures the welfare gain (loss) due
to an increase (decrease) of the bird population B induced by an increase (decrease) of
the habitat size W. Conditions (13d) and (13e) also highlight the public good properties
of wood W and bird B, as their levels aﬀect the welfare of all communities simultaneously
via hunting and the ecotourism enterprise.
Condition (13b) says that in the social optimum the welfare gain of an additional
unit of land employed in crop production equals the shadow price of wood. Similarly,
condition (13c) claims that, in the social optimum and as long as not all labor is employed
in crop production (i.e.  li = 0), the welfare gain for all n communities of employing an
additional marginal unit of labor in crop production plus the welfare gain of the resulting
increase in the bird population due to lower hunting pressure equals the welfare loss of
reducing the amount of labor employed in hunting by a marginal unit.
Solving for the shadow prices λW and λB, and inserting into conditions (13b) and


































+  l . (14b)
As the right hand side of equations (14) is identical for all i = 1,...,n, so is the left
hand side. This implies that the socially optimal bio-economic equilibrium is governed
by identical choices of fi and li of all n communities:
fi = f , li = l , ci = c , ∀i = 1,...,n . (15)
Inserting into equations (14) yields the following two necessary and suﬃcient conditions


























= ˆ  l − Hl(B,l) , (16b)
with ˆ  l =
 li
λci.
Due to the inequality constraints (11), the optimization problem (10) can exhibit two
qualitatively diﬀerent socially optimal bio-economic equilibria: a corner solution and an
8interior solution. In the corner solution the inequality constraints (11) hold with equality,
i.e. all n communities employ their labor endowment solely in crop production.4 In the
interior solution all inequality constraints (11) are non-binding. The following proposition
elaborates on these solutions.
Proposition 2 (Social optimum)
The maximization problem (10), subject to equations (7), (8), (9), and the inequality
constraints (11), exhibits the following solutions:
(i) A unique corner solution (l⋆,f⋆), with l⋆ = 1 and f⋆ given implicitly by the solution
of the equation
α1βf







1 − nf⋆ −
α3
ǫ (1 − nf⋆)γ￿
(1 − β)f⋆β . (18)
(ii) Otherwise, the unique interior solution (f⋆,l⋆) is given implicitly by the solution
of the following system of equations:
0 = α1βf
β−1l





































For α2 suﬃciently small, an interior optimal bio-economic equilibrium depends on
the exogenous parameters as given by the following table:5
4 Note that there are no corner solutions with f = 0 and/or l = 0, as the marginal productivity of crop
production with respect to f and l goes to inﬁnity if f and/or l tend to zero, and there is no corner
solution with f = 1
n as marginal ecotourism revenues go to inﬁnity if f tends to 1
n.
5 A “+” (“−”) indicates that the corresponding endogenous variable increases (decreases), when the
corresponding exogenous parameter increases (decreases). A “?” indicates that the eﬀect is ambiguous.
9f l W B P H 1
nE c
α1 + + − − + − − +
α2 − − + + − + + +
α3 − − + + − + + +
βa) −/+ −/? +/− +/− −/? +/? +/− −/+
γb) −/+ −/+ +/− +/− −/+ +/− ?/− −
ǫ − − + + − ? + +
n − − + + − + − −
a) The ﬁrst (second) sign applies if f⋆ < (>) l⋆.




Proposition 2 says that if condition (18) holds, assigning any labor to hunting is not eﬃ-
cient and, therefore, all labor is used in crop production. As a consequence, consumption
is solely produced by farmland cultivation and ecotourism revenues. Moreover, measured
in units of land necessary, wildlife is most eﬃciently conserved if condition (18) holds.
The bird population is not diminished by hunting and the bird population develops to
its maximal possible level given by the habitat size W.
From the comparative static results of the interior solution we see that the higher
is the overall productivity of the ecotourism enterprise, α3, the higher are the levels
of habitat, wildlife and consumption. Thus, ecotourism has not only the potential to
achieve conservation and development goals simultaneously, but it inﬂuences the optimal
conservation goal. The more productive is the ecotourism enterprise, the higher are the
optimal levels of wildlife and habitat. As a consequence, ecotourism is rather an activity
which increases the valuation of nature conservation than just a vessel to incorporate
exogenously given levels of wood and bird.
Other interesting results are that an increase in the overall productivity of hunting, α2,
increases both the optimal level of consumption derived from hunting and the optimal
levels of wood and bird, and that an increase in the number of communities, n, increases
the optimal levels of habitat and wildlife, while consumption per community drops. The
reason for the latter result is that the negative externalities created from using land
as farmland and hunting bird increase with the number of communities. However, it is
crucial to keep in mind that these results only hold for suﬃciently small α2.
104 Farming, hunting and wildlife conservation in the decentralized
economy
So far we have investigated the levels of wildlife and habitat conservation in the social
optimum. In line with Bulte and Horan (2003), Johannesen and Skonhoft (2005), and
Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), among others, we assume that the state cannot enforce
the optimal levels of wood, W ⋆, and bird, B⋆. Thus, the n communities face de facto an
open access regime with respect to both wildlife and habitat. Due to the public good
properties of wood and bird, the actions of individual communities impose externalities
on other communities, which are not taken into account by the individual communities.
Thus, in general, the decentralized solution in the unregulated open access regime falls
short of the social optimum.
To see what an ICDP such as non-invasive ecotourism can achieve in terms of wildlife
and habitat conservation, we investigate the decentralized outcome both in a laissez faire
economy without any state interventions and in an economy where the state distributes
ecotourism revenues (at least partly) among the local communities. Although sharing
ecotourism revenues increases the levels of wood and bird in the decentralized solution,
we will see that the negative externalities cannot be fully internalized. We, therefore,
propose a more encompassing tax/subsidy regime, which allows to implement the op-
timal levels of wildlife and habitat. To this end, we ﬁrst reﬂect about possible levers
for policy interventions and introduce a common notation for the diﬀerent decentralized
regimes.
4.1 Generic decentralized solution
In principle, the social optimum can be achieved either by imposing taxes/subsidies on
the inputs f and l or on the outputs P, H and E. Empirical evidence suggests that the
labor distribution is private knowledge and hunting can be observed neither directly nor
indirectly. As a consequence, we cannot impose a tax/subsidy on the labor distribution
l and on the outcome of hunting H. We assume, however, that we can observe the level
of farmland f which is cultivated and the crop output P. In addition, the state is aware
of the ecotourism revenues E. Denoting the taxes/subsidies on ecotourism revenues,
farmland production and the level of farmland as τ0, τ1 and τ2, the consumption of
11community i is given by:6
ci = (1 − τ1)P(fi,li) + H(B,li) − τ2fi −
τ0
n
E(B) , i = 1,...,n , (20)
with τ0,τ1,τ2 ∈ R.7 Interpreting the distribution of ecotourism revenues as a subsidy
allows us to investigate diﬀerent decentralized regimes by using the same notation. A
laissez faire economy, for example, is given by τ0 = τ1 = τ2 = 0, while the ICDP case is
given by τ0 ∈ [−1,0), τ1 = τ2 = 0.
In the decentralized solution, each community i chooses fi and li such as to maximizes
its own welfare, given the choices fj, lj (j  = i) of all other communities. Thus, the




V (ci) , (21)
subject to equations (7), (8), (20), and the inequality constraints
0 ≤ 1 − li , (22a)
0 ≤ 1 −
n X
j=1
fj = W . (22b)
Note that the inequality constraint (22b) can only be binding if τ0 ≥ 0. Denoting the
Lagrange multipliers for the equality constraints (7), (8) and (20) by λB, λW and λci,
and the Kuhn-Tucker parameter for the inequality constraints (22a) and (22b) by  li
and  f, we derive the following Lagrangian L:
L = V (ci) + λci
h
































6 We adopt the usual convention that a positive τi denotes a tax, while a negative τi resembles a
subsidy.
7 As the ecotourism enterprise is run by the state, it might be diﬃcult to “tax” the local communities
in proportion to the ecotourism revenues. However, they can certainly be “subsidized”, which is, in
fact, distributing the ecotourism revenues to the local communities.




′(ci) − λci = 0 , (24a)
∂L
∂fi
= λci [(1 − τ1)Pfi(fi,li) − τ2] − λW −  f = 0 , (24b)
∂L
∂li
= λci [(1 − τ1)Pli(fi,li) + Hli(B,li)] +
α2
ǫ











− λB = 0 , (24d)
∂L
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= 0 , (24e)
 li ≥ 0 ,  li(1 − li) = 0 , (24f)







= 0 . (24g)
Comparing the necessary conditions (24) with the corresponding conditions in the social
optimum (13), we see, apart from taxation, one crucial diﬀerence. The shadow price
of bird, λB, encompasses in the decentralized solution only the own welfare gains of
an additional unit of bird, and not the sum of welfare gains over all n communities.
Consequently, the shadow price of wood, λW, only accounts for own welfare gains due to
a marginal increase in the level of habitat. Here, again, the public good nature of bird
B and wood W becomes obvious.
As in the case of the social optimum, the ﬁrst-order conditions are not necessarily suﬃ-
cient, as the Lagrangian (23) is not necessarily concave. Apart from the non-concavity of
H, taxation can endanger concavity. The following proposition gives suﬃcient conditions
for the strict concavity of the Lagrangian (23).
Proposition 3 (Strict concavity in the decentralized solution)
Given the maximization problem (21) subject to equations (7), (8), (20) and the inequal-
ity constraints (22), the corresponding Lagrangian L as given by equation (23) is strictly
concave for all α2 ∈ [0, ¯ α2] with some ¯ α2 > 0, if
τ0 < 0 ∧ τ1 < 1. (25)
Again, the Lagrangian is strictly concave if α2 is suﬃciently small and there is at least
some sharing of ecotourism revenues (τ0 < 0). The condition τ1 < 1 is rather a technical
restriction and says that the tax on crop production has to be less than 100%. As we
13will see, it is easily met in the optimal tax/subsidy regime, where τ1 < 0.
Solving equations (24d) and (24e) for the shadow prices λB and λW, and inserting
into equations (24b) and (24c) yields the following reaction functions for community i:
















+ ˆ  f , (26a)











= −Hli(B,li) + ˆ  l , (26b)
with ˆ  f =
 f
λci and ˆ  li =
 li
λci. As all n communities are identical, we focus on symmetric
Nash equilibria, i.e. fi = f, li = l, ∀i = 1,...,n. As a consequence, the unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium ( ˆ f,ˆ l) is given by the solution of the following two equations, if the
conditions (25) of proposition 3 hold:













+ ˆ  f , (27a)











= −Hl(B,l) + ˆ  l . (27b)
4.2 Laissez faire economy
As a benchmark what diﬀerent tax/subsidy regimes can achieve, we ﬁrst investigate a
laissez faire economy, without any taxes and subsidies, i.e. τ0 = τ1 = τ2 = 0. Note that
this also implies that communities do not beneﬁt from ecotourism revenues.













WHB(B,l) = −Hl(B,l) + ˆ  l . (28b)
As τ0 = 0, we have to check for the additional corner solution ˆ f =
1
n. However, it
is obvious that only the corner solution
￿
ˆ f = 1
n,ˆ l = 1
￿
, in which conditions (22a) and
(22b) hold simultaneously, can be a Nash equilibrium, as consumption from hunting
vanishes in either corner solutions and consumption from crop production is the higher
the higher are f and l.
Unfortunately τ0 = 0 violates condition (25) of proposition 3. As can be seen from
equation (A.12) in the appendix, the Lagrangian is not concave for small α2 and the
suﬃciency of the ﬁrst order conditions (28) is not guaranteed. One can show that both
the interior solution of the system of equations (28) (if it exists) and the corner solution
14￿
ˆ f = 1
n,ˆ l = 1
￿
are always local maxima but not necessarily global maxima. The following
proposition gives details about the symmetric Nash equilibria in the laissez faire economy.
Proposition 4 (Nash equilibria in the laissez faire economy)
For τ0 = τ1 = τ2 = 0 the game, in which each community solves maximization problem
(21) subject to equations (7), (8), (20), the inequality constraints (22) and given the
choices of all other communities, exhibits the following symmetric Nash equilibria:
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(ii) A unique symmetric Nash equilibrium ( ˆ f,ˆ l) which is given implicitly by the solution












0 = α1(1 − β)f
βl
−β − α2(1 − nf)
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and ( ˆ f,ˆ l), the latter given implicitly by the
solution of the system of equations (30), if
α1
nβ = α1 ˆ f
βˆ l
1−β + α2(1 − n ˆ f)
h
(1 − ˆ l) − n
α2
ǫ




Apart from case (iii), which only occurs accidentally for speciﬁc parameter constella-
tions, proposition 4 establishes that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in
the laissez faire economy, which is either an interior or a corner solution. It is obvious
from conditions (29) and (31) that the corner solution applies if α2 is suﬃciently small.
15That is, if the overall productivity of hunting is suﬃciently small, a Nash equilibrium
occurs, in which all land is used as farmland. As a consequence, there is no habitat
left, and the bird population becomes extinct. The reason is that, without ecotourism
revenues, there is no economic incentive for habitat and wildlife conservation if hunting
is very unproductive. Even if hunting is suﬃciently productive to support an interior
solution as a Nash equilibrium, the negative externalities of the hunting activities of
individual communities on all other communities are not taken into account, and thus
the levels of habitat and wildlife fall short of the social optimal levels. This may explain
why the “fences and ﬁnes” approach to habitat and wildlife conservation fails if the local
communities face de facto an open access regime with respect to wood and bird.8
4.3 Sharing ecotourism revenues
The next case we investigate is given by τ1 = τ2 = 0 and τ0 ∈ [−1,0). This is the ICDP
case, where local communities have additional incentives to conserve habitat and wildlife
as they (at least to some extent) beneﬁt from the ecotourism revenues which hinge on
the abundance of bird and wood.
As long as τ0 is strictly negative, the inequality condition (22b) is never binding in
the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the conditions (25) of Proposition 3 are met, and thus



























= −Hl(B,l) + ˆ  l . (33b)
Like in the socially optimal bioeconomic equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium can exhibit
a corner solution, in which all labor is assigned to crop production, and thus no hunting
is undertaken, and an interior solution, in which farmland production, hunting and the
ecotourism revenues contribute to consumption. The following proposition characterizes
the symmetric Nash equilibria.
Proposition 5 (Nash equilibria with sharing ecotourism revenues)
For τ0 ∈ [−1,0), τ1 = τ2 = 0 the game, in which each community solves maximization
8 Note that in our model welfare solely depends on consumption. As a consequence, there are only
incentives to conserve habitat and wildlife if this increases consumption either via hunting or eco-
tourism revenues. We do certainly not deny that there are other motivations, despite consumption,
for conserving habitat and wildlife, such as traditional, ethical or religious reasons. They are, however,
not captured in our model.
16problem (21) subject to equations (7), (8), (20), the inequality constraints (22) and
given the choices of all other communities, exhibits the following unique symmetric Nash
equilibria:
(i) A unique symmetric Nash equilibrium ( ˆ f,1), where ˆ f given implicitly by the solu-

















1 − n ˆ f
￿γi
(1 − β) ˆ fβ . (35)
(ii) Otherwise, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium ( ˆ f,ˆ l) is given implicitly by the























0 = α1(1 − β)f
βl
−β − α2(1 − nf)
h

















For α2 suﬃciently small, an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium depends on the
exogenous parameters as given by the following table:9
9 A “+” (“−”) indicates that the corresponding endogenous variable increases (decreases), when the
corresponding exogenous parameter increases (decreases). A “?” indicates that the eﬀect is ambiguous.
17f l W B P H
−τ0
n E c
α1 + + − − + − − +
α2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? +
α3 − − + + − + + +
βa) −/+ −/? +/− +/− −/? +/? +/− −/+
γb) −/+ −/+ +/− +/− −/+ +/− +/? −
ǫ − − + + − ? + +
nc) +/− +/− − − +/− −/? − −
−τ0 − − + + − + + +
a) The ﬁrst (second) sign applies if f⋆ < (>) l⋆.




c) The ﬁrst (second) sign applies if f⋆ < (>) 1
(2−γ)n.
The comparative static results are similar to the social optimum. We see that the levels
of habitat, wildlife and consumption are the higher, the higher is the overall productivity
of ecotourism, α3, and the higher is the share of ecotourism revenues distributed to the
local communities, −τ0. The comparative static results with respect to n, however, are
diﬀerent from the social optimum. Under a decentralized regime with sharing ecotourism
revenues, habitat and wildlife decrease with increasing number of communities n, while
they increase in the social optimum. The reason is that the negative externalities of
reduced wildlife and habitat levels, which are increasing in n, are not taken into account
by the individual community’s actions in the decentralized solution.
To see what sharing ecotourism revenues can achieve compared to the laissez faire
economy and the social optimum, the following proposition ranks the diﬀerent outcomes.
Proposition 6 (Comparison of outcomes under diﬀerent regimes)
Denoting the labor distribution l and the levels of farmland f, wood W, the bird popula-
tion B and consumption c of the social optimum, the laissez faire economy and the decen-
tralized solution with sharing ecotourism by (f⋆,l⋆,W ⋆,B⋆,c⋆), ( ˆ fLF,ˆ lLF, ˆ W LF, ˆ BLF,ˆ cLF)
18and ( ˆ fSE,ˆ lSE, ˆ W SE, ˆ BSE,ˆ cSE), the following relationships hold:
f
⋆ < ˆ f
SE < ˆ f
LF , (37a)
l
⋆ ≥ ˆ l
SE ≥ ˆ l
LF , (37b)
W
⋆ > ˆ W
SE > ˆ W
LF , (37c)
B
⋆ > ˆ B
SE > ˆ B
LF , (37d)
c
⋆ > ˆ c
SE > ˆ c
LF , (37e)
where the equality sign only holds in the corner solution. Moreover, the following rela-




1 < ¯ α
SE
1 . (38)
Note that there is a continuous transition from the laissez faire economy to the ICDP
case. For τ0 close to 0 the Nash equilibria of the decentralized solution with sharing
ecotourism revenues are arbitrarily close to the equilibria of the laissez faire economy.
Thus, in order to achieve substantial wildlife and habitat conservation, a substantial
share of the ecotourism revenues has to be distributed among the communities. Moreover,
from the comparative static results we know that both habitat and wildlife conservation,
and consumption increase with the share, −τ0, which is distributed. Therefore, the ICDP
is the more successful in achieving both goals, conserving nature and increasing the
standard of living of the local population the higher is −τ0.
On the other hand, even the full distribution of ecotourism revenues among the local
population, i.e. τ0 = −1, does not achieve the social optimum for n > 1, as the decen-
tralized solution fails to adequately account for the negative externalities. Thus, in the
decentralized ICDP case there is, in general, too much land use and too much hunt-
ing compared to the socially optimal bio-economic equilibrium and, as a consequence,
lower levels of habitat, wildlife and consumption. From the relationship (38), we see
that if α1 ∈ (¯ αSE
1 , ¯ α⋆
1), then hunting is individually rational under the ICDP regime,
although hunting is ineﬃcient from a socially optimal point of view. This may explain,
why ICDPs often fail to achieve acceptance of strict anti-poaching regulations with the
local communities.
194.4 Optimal tax/subsidy regime
From proposition 6 it is clear that sharing ecotourism revenues can indeed achieve better
nature conservation and higher standard of living compared to the open access laissez
faire economy. It is also clear, however, that the ICDP case fails to achieve the socially
optimal bio-economic equilibrium, as the negative externalities are not adequately ac-
counted for. In the following we introduce a more encompassing tax/subsidy mechanism,
which implements the socially optimal bio-economic equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium
of the decentralized economy.
Comparing the necessary conditions of the social optimum (16) and the decentralized
solution (27), we seek taxes/subsidies τ0, τ1 and τ2 such that:
































If we impose, in addition, a balanced state budget
0 = nτ1P(f,l) + nτ2f + (1 + τ0)E(B) , (39c)
we get a linear system of three equations for the three unknowns τ0, τ1 and τ2. This
yields the unique solution:
τ
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Although there exists a unique solution for the tax/subsidy levers to achieve the same
necessary conditions for the Nash equilibrium in the decentralized economy as in the
social optimum, the solution might be diﬃcult to implement if it implies taxation of
the ecotourism revenues, i.e. τ⋆
0 ≥ 0. First, if τ⋆
0 is non-negative, the Lagrangian L
(23) is not strictly concave even for small α2. As a consequence, the social optimum
might not be the only Nash equilibrium or might not even be a Nash equilibrium at all.
Second, it might be diﬃcult to politically justify a taxation of ecotourism revenues on
the level of the individual communities as the revenues are earned by the state and not
20the individual communities. The following proposition, however, establishes that τ⋆
0 < 0
for α2 suﬃciently small.




2, as given by equations (40), the game in which each community solves
maximization problem (21) subject to equations (7), (8), (20), the inequality constraints
(22) and given the choices of all other communities, exhibits the social optimum, as given
by proposition 2, as the unique Nash equilibrium for all α2 ∈ [0, ¯ α2] with some ¯ α2 > 0.
In addition, the following relationships hold:
τ
⋆
0 < −1 , τ
⋆
1 < 0 , τ
⋆
2 > 0 . (41)
Proposition 7 says that, if α2 is suﬃciently small, the socially optimal bio-economic
equilibrium can be implemented by taxing farmland f (τ2 > 0) and subsidizing crop
production P (τ1 < 0). The economic intuition is straightforward. In the laissez faire
economy, communities choose too high levels of f and too small levels of l compared
to the social optimum. Recall that we cannot directly tax or subsidize l as the labor
distribution is private knowledge. Therefore, we have to increase the level of l indirectly
by subsidizing crop production. This gives incentives to increase both the levels of labor
l and land f in agricultural production. Therefore, the incentive to increase the level of
farmland f has to be counteracted by taxation.
We also see from τ0 < −1 that the taxes collected from farmland outweigh the subsidies
payed to crop production, while the surplus is distributed via the sharing of ecotourism
revenues. This implies, however, that the tax/subsidy regime is viable even without prof-
its from the ecotourism enterprise. Or put the other way round, the state can implement
the optimal levels of wildlife and habitat and, in addition, raise funds for the provision
of additional public goods such as schooling or infrastructure improvements.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Before we draw conclusions from our results and answer our initial question about why
ICDPs fail, we discuss some of our model assumptions with respect to our results.
First, all our results have only been shown to be valid if the overall productivity of
hunting α2 is “suﬃciently small”. Formally, suﬃciently small means that the Lagrangians
(12) and (23) are strictly concave so that the necessary conditions (16) and (27) ensure
the existence of a unique solution. In more economic terms suﬃciently small means that
21the consumption derived from hunting is not too high compared to the consumption
derived by crop production and ecotourism revenues. Although we cannot argue that
this assumption is necessarily fulﬁlled, we consider it as the standard case. This point of
view is supported by empirical evidence. Barrett and Arcese (1998) argue that, under the
local conditions given in many developing countries, wildlife harvest is not proﬁtable for
most animal species. This also justiﬁes the strict no-hunting policies of many protected
areas.
Second, in our model welfare solely depends on consumption. This has two immediate
consequences. On the one hand, both wood and bird are only valued with respect to
their possibility to create consumption. Thus, our model does not allow for intrinsic
values of wildlife and habitat due to traditional, cultural or ethical considerations. On
the other hand, the choices of farmland and labor distribution are such as to maximize
consumption. In particular, hunting is only undertaken to increase consumption not
for traditional, ritual or religious purposes. Of course, we do not deny that there are
other contributions to welfare apart from consumption and we do not deny that local
communities may hunt for other reasons than game meat.10 The reason for our model
design is the desire to explain the observable overuse of habitat and wildlife in reserves
with poorly enforced property rights. In our opinion the main problem is that individ-
ual economic incentives result in an overexploitation of habitat and wildlife. Intrinsic
valuations of habitat and wildlife would lead to higher conservation levels both in the
social optimum and in the decentralized solution, but they would still fall apart due to
the public good properties of wood and bird. However, if the local communities hunt
because of non-consumption motives, even a tax/subsidy regime as proposed in section
4.4 might fail to implement a strict no-hunting policy. But in this case a no-hunting
policy is not socially optimal in the ﬁrst place, and thus there is rather an issue of ill
deﬁned conservation goals than narrowing the gap between decentralized outcome and
social optimum.
Third, for the optimal tax/subsidy regime to be implemented both land use f and
crop production P have to be determined. Obviously, there are incentives for the local
population to understate the land use f and to overstate crop production P in order
to pay less taxes and get higher subsidies. As wood should be easily distinguished from
farmland, it should be relatively easy to observe f, while it might be more diﬃcult to
determine each community’s crop production. At least if local communities are not sub-
sistence farmers, which consume substantial shares of their crop productiuon themselves,
10 See, for example, Winkler (2006) for a bio-economic model with intrinsic values of wildlife.
22the state could buy agricultural output at subsidized prizes. As local communities vary
substantially, there is little general advice how to overcome these problems. It should be
noted, however, that it might be at least costly to get good estimates for land use and
agricultural output.
Forth, we consider a quasi-static model where we concentrate on the bio-economic
equilibrium and do not take into account transition dynamics. This is justiﬁed if the
population of the local communities stays constant and there are no irreversibility con-
straints with respect to habitat and wildlife. In fact, the local population in the vicinity
of many protected areas in developing countries is growing and there are many ecosys-
tems which exhibit irreversibility constraints.11 Thus, we consider the extension to a
dynamic model as a promising agenda for future research.
Finally, we come back to our initial question. In summary, there are four reasons why
ICDPs fail. First, ICDPs may give wrong incentives, such as lump sum transfers ﬁnanced
by ecotourism revenues. If there is no link between the conservation and the development
activity, higher transfers do not give any incentives to conserve wildlife or habitat. It is
widely recognized that a successful ICDP has to communicate the link between higher
levels of wildlife and habitat on the one hand, and higher income on the other hand.
Second, ICDPs may give too little incentives. We have seen from proposition 6 that the
outcome of the ICDP case is arbitrarily close to the laissez faire economy if τ0 is close
to 0. Thus, in order to achieve a substantial increase in nature conservation compared
to the laissez faire economy, the ICDP has to promise substantial consumption gains for
conservation activities. This also implies, that the development activity must be able
to earn substantial and reliable revenues. Obviously, these ﬁrst two reasons are well
addressed in the literature and have been conﬁrmed by our model.
Third, the ICDP may inﬂuence the conservation goal. With a proﬁtable ecotourism
enterprise established both habitat and wildlife are scarcer resources than they would be
without the ecotourism business. As a consequence, the optimal conservation goal may be
inﬂuenced by the development activities of the ICDP. If this is not taken into account, but
the ICDP is rather thought of as an “implementation vessel” for given conservation goals,
the ICDP is unlikely to achieve “optimal” conservation levels. Fourth, just establishing
the link between the conservation activities and the development activities may fail to
achieve the social optimum even if all revenues are distributed to the local population,
because of negative externalities which arise due to public good properties of wildlife
11 As an example think of rainforest, which does not re-grow in the same way, once slashed down to
gain agricultural land.
23an habitat. In our model we have two negative externalities and with the sharing of
ecotourism revenues just one policy lever. In general, it is therefore not possible to achieve
the socially optimal outcome. In fact, the higher is the number of communities n, the
higher are the negative externalities imposed by the action of one community on all other
communities, and the larger is the gap between the social optimum and the decentralized
outcome in the ICDP case. This may explain why ICDPs fail to gain acceptance among
the local population for strict no-hunting policies. It may be individually rational to
hunt, although hunting is not socially optimal.
Nevertheless, the idea of combining conservation and development goals is appealing
and can achieve substantial improvements compared to a laissez faire open access regime.
In fact, we are not arguing against ICDPs but rather suggest to complement them with
more encompassing tax/subsidy regimes, which take into account and correct for the
negative externalities. We warn however, to underestimate the relevance of internalizing
the negative externalities even if n is small. Our comparative static results show that
the ICDP gives completely wrong incentives for increasing n. While an increasing n
leads to higher socially optimal levels of habitat and wildlife, these levels decrease in the
ICDP case. As population growth is a fact in many developing countries, the number
of communities n might increase over time. Moreover, an increasing population can
endanger the development goal of ICDPs. A non-growing ecological resource distributed
among an increasing number of heads must eventually fail to satisfy the needs of the local
population (Barrett and Arcese 1995, 1998). Although in our model the revenues created
from the ICDP do not depend on wildlife harvest, the funds created by ecotourism are
likely to be bounded from above. Thus, at least in the long run, the revenues created
by ecotourism have to be complemented by other means to raise income. Therefore, the
thorough investigation of the link between the eﬀectiveness of ICDPs and population
growth in a dynamic model is a promising avenue for future research.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
In the following we derive conditions which guarantee the strict concavity of the La-
grangian L (12). First, we neglect the inequality constraint (11). Note that if L is concave






As all communities are identical, the optimization problem (10) is equivalent to max-
imizing the welfare of a representative community and taking into account that fi = f,
24li = l and ci = c for all i = 1,...,n. Instead of introducing the Lagrange multipliers λB,
λW and λci, we can directly substitute the equality constraints (7), (8) and (9) into the
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As V is a strictly concave and monotonously increasing function of c, V (c) is strictly
quasi-concave if c is jointly strictly concave in f and l. It is easy to see that c is not con-
cave in general. While the ﬁrst and third summand are concave (and the third strictly),
the second term is not. Obviously, the sum of these three terms is not necessarily strictly
concave. However, c is strictly concave if the second term is small enough, i.e. the pro-
ductivity of hunting, α2, is suﬃciently small.
Consumption c is strictly concave in f and l if cff < 0, cll < 0 and the determinant
of the Hessian is positive, i.e. cffcll − c2
fl > 0. The second order derivatives of c read:
cff = −α1β(1 − β)f
β−2l


















































Obviously, cff < 0 and cll < 0, but the sign of cffcll − c2
fl hings upon the value of α2.
To see that D = cffcll −c2
fl > 0 for small α2, we develop D in a ﬁrst order Taylor series
around α2 = 0:
D ≈ nα1α3β(1 − β)γ(1 − γ)(1 − nf)
γ−2f
βl
























= X1 + α2X2 , (A.5)
25with X1 > 0 and X2 < 0. Thus, there exists a non-empty interval I = [0, ¯ α2) with ¯ α2 > 0
such that D > 0 for all α2 ∈ I. ￿
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
The uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed by the strict concavity of the Lagrangian L,
which is elaborated in proposition 1. The corner solution is given by l⋆ = 1. According to
equations (2), (7) and (13f) this implies H = 0, B = W and ˆ  l ≥ 0. Then the necessary







′(B) ≥ −Hl(B,l) . (A.7)
From the ﬁrst equation, we derive an implicit equation for the optimal level of farmland
f⋆. Inserting f⋆ into the second equation and solving for α1 yields the inequality (18).
The implicit equations (19) for the interior solution (f⋆,l⋆) are derived from equations
(16) by setting ˆ  l = 0 and inserting equations (7) and (8).
To derive the comparative static results we apply the implicit function theorem on
equations (19). Note that equations (19) are equivalent to cf(f,l) = 0 and cl(f,l) = 0




















where ￿ ∈ {α1,α2,α3,β,γ,ǫ,n}. Then, the comparative static results are given by (all






































. As the sign of D depends on the value of α2 (see proposition






d￿ will, in general depend on the value of α2. As we are






a Taylor series of the ﬁrst non-vanishing order around α2 = 0. ￿
A.3 Proof of proposition 3
Analogously to the proof of proposition 1, strict concavity of the Lagrangian L (23) is
guaranteed if consumption ci is jointly strictly concave in fi and li.





































Diﬀerentiating (A.10) twice with respect to fi and fi and only considering symmetric
Nash equilibria, i.e. fj = f, lj = l, ∀i = 1,...n, yields
























































Developping cffcll − c2
fl in a ﬁrst-order Taylor series around α2 = 0, we achieve:































= (1 − τ1)[−τ0X1 − α2(−τ0X2 + X3)] , (A.12)
with X1,X2,X3 > 0. Thus, if τ1 < 1 and τ0 < 0, then cff < 0 and cll < 0, and there
exists a non-empty interval I = [0, ¯ α2) with ¯ α2 > 0 such that D > 0 for all α2 ∈ I. ￿
27A.4 Proof of proposition 4
As the Lagrangian L (23) is not concave, the conditions (27) are necessary but not
suﬃcient for a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, uniqueness is not guaranteed.
First we show that there is at most one interior solution of equations (27). Setting












1 − (n + 1)
α2
ǫ (1 − l)
￿ . (A.13)

















exists at most one interior solution. Second, from equations (A.11a) and (A.11b) we see
that cff < 0 and cll < 0 for τ0 = 0. As a consequence, an interior solution (if it exists)
is a local maximum.
Thus, if there is no interior solution or the interior solution yields lower welfare than
the corner solution, the corner solution is the only Nash equilibrium. If there is an interior
solution and it yields higher welfare than the corner solution, the interior solution is the
only Nash equilibrium. If there exits an interior solution which yields the same welfare
as the corner solution,we have two Nash equilibria. These three cases are tested by
conditions (29), (31) and (32). ￿
A.5 Proof of proposition 5
The uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed by the strict concavity of the Lagrangian
L (23), which is elaborated in proposition 3. The corner solution is given by l⋆ = 1.
According to equations (2), (7) and (13f) this implies H = 0, B = W and ˆ  l ≥ 0. Then













′(B) ≥ −Hl(B,l) . (A.15)
The ﬁrst equation is an implicit equation for the optimal level of farmland ˆ f. Inserting
ˆ f into the second equation and solving for α2 yields the inequality (35). The implicit
equations (36) for the interior solution ( ˆ f,ˆ l) are derived from equations (27) by setting
ˆ  l = 0 and inserting equations (7) and (8).
Analogously to the proof of proposition 2, the comparative static results are derived
28by appling the implicit function theorem on equations (36). Given D, Df￿ and Dl￿ as
deﬁned in equations (A.8) with ￿ ∈ {α1,α2,α3,β,γ,ǫ,n,−τ0}, the comparative static







































. As the sign of D depends on the value of α2 (see propo-
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d￿ into a Taylor series of the ﬁrst non-vanishing order around α2 = 0. ￿
A.6 Proof of proposition 6
Comparing the levels of f and l in the corner solution, we see from equations (17) and
(34), and proposition 4 part (i):
f
⋆ < ˆ f






⋆ = ˆ l
SE = ˆ l
LF = 1 . (A.17b)
For the interior solution we compare equations (19), (30) and (36) to get:
Pf(l
⋆,f
⋆) > Pf(ˆ l
SE, ˆ f





⋆) < Pl(ˆ l
SE, ˆ f
SE) < Pl(ˆ l
LF, ˆ f
LF) . (A.18b)
This implies for f and l:
f
⋆ < ˆ f
SE < ˆ f
LF , (A.19a)
l
⋆ > ˆ l
SE > ˆ l
LF . (A.19b)
From the relationships (A.17a) and (A.19a) follow directly the relationships for the levels
of wood W and bird B. The relationships for consumption c follow from the comparative
static results of propositions 2 and 5.
To compare the upper bound of α1 for which the corner solution applies between the
29social optimum and the ICDP case, we re-write conditions (17), (34), (18) and (35):
0 = α1βf
β−1 − xα3γ(1 − nf)
γ−1 , (A.20a)
¯ α1 =
1 − nf − x
α3
ǫ γ(1 − nf)γ
(1 − β)fβ , (A.20b)
where ¯ α1 denotes the lower bound of α1 in the inequalities (18) and (35). Furthermore,



























From x⋆ > xSE follows ¯ α⋆
1 < ¯ αSE
1 . ￿
A.7 Proof of proposition 7










(1 − nf)f ≥ 0 . (A.22)
As both f and l are bounded from above, there exists a non-empty interval I1 = [0, ˜ α2]
such that condition (A.22), and as a consequence, also conditions (41) hold for all α2 ∈ I1.
In particular, τ0 < 0 and τ1 < 1 if conditions (41) hold. According to proposition 3, this
implies that there is a non-empty interval I2 = [0, ˆ α2] such that the Lagrangian L (23)
is strictly concave for all α2 ∈ I2, and thus the necessary conditions (27) determine the
unique Nash equilibrium in the decentralized economy. Thus, setting ¯ α2 = min(˜ α2, ˆ α2)
proves the proposition. ￿
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